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Trends in the Social [Ir]responsibility of
American Multimational Corporations:
Increased Power, Diminished Accountability
Cynthia A. Williams and John M. Conley
Abstract
The purpose of this invited essay is to assess the future of the CSR performance of Ameri-
can multinationals in light of several ongoing trends. These trends include companies’ voluntary
CSR programs and the global self-regulatory standards for responsible company activities that are
developing in almost every industry. Moreover, the decade-long project at the United Nations
to identify multinational companies’ responsibilities with respect to international human rights,
ultimately spearheaded by Special Representative John Ruggie, has for the first time established
global expectations of responsible corporate activity. At the same time, however, legal develop-
ments in the United States may be trending in the opposite direction, toward increased power and
diminished accountability for corporations. Two legal developments that highlight this counter-
trend will frame this discussion. The first, the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) recognizes a constitutional right for corpo-
rations to give financial support to a wide range of electioneering activities, including by using
corporate funds to pay for and broadcast advertisements for specific candidates for office. The
effect is to allow American companies to further consolidate their already substantial political
power. The second, the opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc denied, 642 F.3d 379 (2011),
aff’d, 569 U.S. , 133 S. Ct.1659(Apr. 17, 2013), denied the possibility of corporate liability
under the Alien Tort Statute for Royal Dutch Shell’s employees’ alleged violations of Nigerian
community members’ international human rights. A 2-1 majority held instead that violations of
international law could only be asserted against natural persons or nations. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and in a decision handed down on April 17, 2013, the Court unanimously af-
firmed the judgment of the Second Circuit. The five-Justice opinion of the Court held that the
ATS cannot be used to redress violations of the law of nations that occur outside the territory of
the United States, except in exceptional circumstances not found in Kiobel. Neither the majority
opinion nor the concurrence addressed the corporate liability issue, which means that the Second
Circuit’s ruling on that issue remains the law of the Second Circuit — an important outcome, given
the significance of the Second Circuit as a venue for ATS cases. Taken together, the overall effect
of the Second Circuit’s rejection of corporate liability for human rights violations and the Supreme
Court’s rejection of exterritorial application of the ATS to any defendant, corporate or otherwise,
is the substantial evisceration of companies’ legal accountability for international human rights
violations under the ATS. On a theoretical level, these decisions send mixed messages about cor-
porate personhood and identity. But on a practical level, the two decisions work in unfortunate
concert to increase the already considerable political power of U.S. corporations at home, even as
they reduce the risk of legal accountability for their actions abroad. By doing so, they shrink the
shadow of the law — the threat of “hard” legal regulation — that has been an important incentive
to the adoption of voluntary, ”soft-law” CSR standards. Thus, these legal developments, though
ostensibly unrelated to the voluntary pursuit of CSR activity, may in fact act as a disincentive to
that activity.
KEYWORDS: corporate governance, corporate accountability, corporate constitutional rights,
international human rights, Citizens United, Kiobel, Alien Tort Statute, Alien Torts Claims Act
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TRENDS IN THE SOCIAL [IR]RESPONSIBILITY OF 
AMERICAN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: 
INCREASED POWER, DIMINISHED ACCOUNTABILITY? 
Cynthia A. Williams* 
John M. Conley** 
INTRODUCTION 
As we initially considered the invitation to participate in this 
symposium, we focused on the word “normative” in the title, and its 
root, “norms.” We thought about the question of where the norms of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) come from. One source of CSR 
norms is the law. That is, ostensibly voluntary CSR activity can 
sometimes be traced to messages being sent—directly or indirectly—
by courts and legislatures. Such messages may fall short of direct 
mandates, but nonetheless can have a powerful influence on shaping 
corporate behavior in the social and environmental spheres. These 
considerations led us ultimately to focus on two cases that are not 
routinely discussed in the CSR context but which, we think, may be 
sending important messages that could undercut CSR in American 
multinationals. 
The specific purpose of this essay is to assess the future of the CSR 
performance of American multinationals in light of several ongoing 
trends. These trends (which we and several colleagues have explored 
in detail in previous writings1) include companies’ voluntary CSR 
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 1. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams & Ruth V. Aguilera, Corporate Social 
Responsibility in a Comparative Perspective, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 452 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008); John 
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programs and, relatedly, the global self-regulatory standards for 
responsible company activities that are developing in almost every 
industry.2 These voluntary efforts have no doubt improved the lives 
and working conditions of many people throughout the world within 
multinational corporations’ supply chains and other areas of 
influence. Moreover, the decade-long project at the United Nations to 
identify multinational companies’ responsibilities with respect to 
international human rights, ultimately spearheaded by Special 
Representative John Ruggie, has for the first time established global 
expectations of responsible corporate activity.3 
At the same time, however, legal developments in the United 
States may be trending in the opposite direction, toward increased 
power and diminished accountability for corporations. Two legal 
developments that highlight this counter-trend will frame this 
discussion. The first, the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission (FEC),4 recognized a constitutional 
right for corporations to give financial support to a wide range of 
electioneering activities, including by using corporate funds to pay 
for and broadcast advertisements for specific candidates for office.5 
The effect is to allow American companies to further consolidate 
their already substantial political power. 
The second, the opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel I),6 
                                                                                                                 
M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed and Embellish: Theory Versus 
Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1 (2005) 
[hereinafter Engage]; Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility in an 
Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705 (2002), reprinted in 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: LAW, THEORY AND POLICY 30 (Thomas W. Joo ed., 
2004); John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Global Banks as Global 
Sustainability Regulators?: The Equator Principles, 33 L. & POL’Y 542 (2011) 
[hereinafter Global Banks]. 
 2. Margaret M. Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global 
Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L. 325, 329 (2008). 
 3. U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS “PROTECT, 
RESPECT AND REMEDY” FRAMEWORK (2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf. 
 4. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 5. See id. at 365–67. 
 6. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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denied the possibility of corporate liability under the ancient Alien 
Tort Statute (ATS; the statute is also referred to as the Alien Tort 
Claims Act)7 for Royal Dutch Shell’s employees’ alleged violations 
of Nigerian community members’ international human rights.8 A 2-1 
majority held instead that violations of international law could only 
be asserted against natural persons.9 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari and heard oral argument on February 28, 2012, and then 
reargument on October 1, 2012 on the separate issue of the 
extraterritorial reach of the ATS.10 In a decision handed down on 
April 17, 2013, the Court unanimously affirmed the judgment of the 
Second Circuit (Kiobel II).11 The five-Justice opinion of the Court 
held only that the ATS cannot be used to redress violations of the law 
of nations that occur outside the territory of the United States, except 
in exceptional circumstances not found in Kiobel. A concurrence by 
Justice Breyer signed by three others disagreed with the breadth of 
the Court’s statement of the non-extraterritoriality doctrine, but 
agreed that the ATS was unavailable on the facts of this case. Neither 
opinion addressed the corporate liability issue, which means that the 
Second Circuit’s ruling on that issue remains the law of the Second 
Circuit—an important outcome, given the significance of the Second 
Circuit as a venue for ATS cases.12 Taken together, the overall effect 
of the Second Circuit’s rejection of corporate liability for human 
                                                                                                                 
 7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 8. See Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 145. 
 9. See id. at 149. 
 10. Certiorari was granted on October 17, 2011 in conjunction with another 
case, Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority. 132 S. Ct. 454 (2011). In the second case, 
the plaintiff alleged that two organizations, the Palestinian Authority and the 
Palestine Liberation organization, had tortured and killed the plaintiff’s decedent. 
The case presented the question of whether organizations as juridical persons are 
proper defendants in cases brought pursuant to the Torture Victims Protection Act, 
(TVPA), a statute passed in 1991. The language of the TVPA uses the term 
“individual” rather than “person,” creating a civil damages remedy against “[a]n 
individual, who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign 
nation . . . subjects an individual to torture . . . or . . . extrajudicial killing . . . .” 28 
U.S.C. § 1350, note § 2(a)(1)–(2) (emphases added). In a decision last year, while 
Kiobel was awaiting reargument, the Court held unanimously that the term 
“individual” means only natural persons, and does not encompass organizations. 
Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority, 132 S. Ct. 1702 (2012). 
 11. Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 12. See infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. 
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rights violations and the Supreme Court’s rejection of exterritorial 
application of the ATS to any defendant, corporate or otherwise, is 
the substantial evisceration of companies’ legal accountability for 
international human rights violations under the ATS. 
On a theoretical level, these decisions send mixed messages about 
corporate personhood and identity. But on a practical level, the two 
decisions work in unfortunate concert to increase the already 
considerable political power of U.S. corporations at home, even as 
they reduce the risk of legal accountability for their actions abroad. 
By doing so, they shrink the shadow of the law—the threat of “hard” 
legal regulation—that has been an important incentive to the 
adoption of voluntary, “soft-law” CSR standards. Thus, these legal 
developments, though ostensibly unrelated to the voluntary pursuit of 
CSR activity, may in fact act as a disincentive to that activity. 
The structure of this essay is straightforward. First, the Citizens 
United decision will be described and then evaluated in the contexts 
of constitutional law and theory and existing corporate law doctrine. 
Second, the various levels of Kiobel will be described and discussed. 
In contrast to the Second Circuit in Kiobel I, the Courts of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit and for the Seventh Circuit have 
recently both held precisely to the contrary, that a corporation, as a 
juridical entity, can be held liable for violations of international 
human rights law. Those opinions, Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.13 and 
Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co.,14 will also be discussed and 
contrasted to Kiobel I. Third, the CSR implications of Citizens United 
and Kiobel I and II, construed together, will be developed. 
I.     CITIZENS UNITED AND CORPORATE POLITICAL POWER 
A. Summary of Citizens United 
In Citizens United, a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down 
limits under federal law that prohibited corporations or unions from 
spending treasury funds to make independent expenditures (not 
coordinated with candidates or political parties) on “electioneering 
communications,” defined as “[a]ny broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 14. Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2011). 
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Federal office” and is “publicly distributed” within thirty days of a 
primary election and sixty days of a general election.15 Both 
corporations and unions can establish a Political Action Committee 
(PAC) with support from shareholders or employees (in the case of a 
corporation), or union members (in the case of a union), in order to 
make such expenditures at any time with segregated funds.16 The 
Court, however, did not find this option to be a sufficient mechanism 
for communication to render the general statutory scheme 
constitutional.17 
The facts of the case are simple. In 2007 Citizens United produced 
a movie called Hillary: The Movie that was critical of then-
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Wanting to distribute the 
movie broadly, but concerned about potential liability under the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),18 which limits 
independent electioneering expenditures (these limits are usually 
referred to as section 441b from their codification in 2 U.S.C. § 
441b), Citizens United brought an injunctive and declaratory relief 
action in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.19 It argued (1) that section 441b was unconstitutional as 
applied to Hillary; and (2) that the BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure 
                                                                                                                 
 15. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320–21 (2010) (interpreting section 
203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441b 
(2006)). 
 16. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2) (2006). This statute is often referred to as McCain-
Feingold after its principal Republican and Democratic sponsors in the Senate, 
John McCain (R-Arizona) and Russ Feingold (D-Wisconsin). 
 17. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364–66. 
 18. Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 
116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 
U.S.C., 36 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C.). 
 19. Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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requirements20 were unconstitutional as applied to Hillary and to 
three ads promoting the movie.21 
There were a number of unusual aspects of Citizens United that the 
dissent and various commentators have emphasized.22 The claim that 
the challenged limitations on corporate electioneering were facially 
unconstitutional, that is, could not be constitutional under any 
circumstances, had been argued in the alternative in Citizens United’s 
original district court pleadings seeking an injunction.23 But that 
claim had been specifically abandoned by the plaintiff in its motion 
for summary judgment, and both parties had stipulated to its 
dismissal,24 so the question was not (under normal procedure) 
properly in the case on appeal to the Supreme Court.25 Rather, the 
Court sought supplemental briefing and a second round of arguments 
to bring the issue forward.26 
Moreover, the facts of Citizens United do not involve either a for-
profit corporation or a union using treasury funds for electioneering 
communications, even though the opinion generally speaks in broad 
terms of the constitutional right of a for-profit corporation to make 
such expenditures.27 Rather, Citizens United is a non-profit 
corporation specifically organized to engage in political activism, 
primarily funded by individuals, with a “small portion” of its budget 
provided by for-profit corporations. Citizens United has a well-
                                                                                                                 
 20. The disclaimer provision requires identification of the entity funding the 
electioneering communication and a clear disclaimer that the communication does 
not come from the candidate and has not been approved by the candidate. BCRA § 
311, 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2) (2006). The disclosure provision requires any person or 
entity making more than $10,000 per year in independent electioneering 
expenditures to file a report with the FEC identifying the person making the 
expenditure, the amount, the election to which it relates, and identifying certain 
large contributors. BCRA § 201, 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1) (2006). 
 21. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 321. 
 22. See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text; infra Part I.B. 
 23. Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 14–
15, para. 47 Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008) (No. 07-
2240). 
 24. See id.; Joint Stipulation at paras. 1–3, id. 
 25. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 396–98 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 26. Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009). 
 27. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. passim. The opinion equally applies to 
unions, but the majority opinion does not emphasize that aspect of its rationale in 
any regard. 
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funded PAC, which it could have used both to produce the film and 
to distribute it at any time;28 instead, it sought to challenge the 
restrictions. 
The district court, which convened a three-judge panel to hear the 
case (as required under the BCRA), denied the injunction,29 and then 
granted the FEC’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the 
limit on independent electioneering expenditures was facially 
constitutional under the Supreme Court’s 2003 precedent McConnell 
v. FEC,30 and was constitutional as applied to Hillary under FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc.31 since the movie was susceptible to no 
other interpretation than that it was advocating against voting for 
Hillary Clinton.32 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in 
2008,33 and then asked for supplemental briefing and argument in 
2009 of whether some or all of the Court’s prior precedents 
upholding the constitutionality of these limits on independent 
electioneering expenditures (in particular, McConnell and Austin v. 
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce) should be overruled.34 
An important principle of statutory interpretation in the United 
States is, whenever possible, to construe statutes narrowly so as to 
avoid constitutional invalidity. Citizens United had advanced a 
number of narrowing constructions to suggest that its 
communications were not covered by the statute, but none were 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See id. at 321, 337–38 (discussing types of communications political action 
committees can fund). 
 29. Citizens United, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 282. 
 30. Id. at 278 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 203–09 (2003) 
(upholding limits on electioneering communications in a facial challenge)). 
 31. FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007) (“[A] 
court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if 
the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote 
for or against a specific candidate.”). 
 32. Citizens United v. FEC, 2008 WL 2788753, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 2008) 
(following its reasoning in Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d. 274). 
 33. Citizens United v. FEC, 555 U.S. 1028 (2008). 
 34. Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009) (citing McConnell, 540 U.S. 
93 and Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990)). 
McConnell had upheld the § 441b limit in a facial challenge on the authority of 
Austin, which had found constitutional a state law restriction that mirrored § 441b. 
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successful.35 Perhaps the best of these arguments was that the statute 
should not be construed to apply to a nonprofit corporation funded 
overwhelmingly by individuals and specifically organized to advance 
political views, and with only a de minimis amount of corporate 
support. The statute itself clearly excludes from its restrictions 
ideological nonprofit corporations without corporate support. 
Moreover, this construction would have brought the case squarely 
within the holding of the Court’s prior decision in FEC v. 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL),36 which exempted 
from the section 441b limitations nonprofit corporations that are 
formed for the sole purpose of promoting political ideas and do not 
accept corporate or union funds.37 The Court rejected this narrowing 
argument because, in contrast to the situation in MCFL, a “small 
portion” of Citizen United’s budget was from corporate sources.38 
Implying a de minimis exception to the statute and MCFL’s holding 
would “require[] intricate case-by-case determinations,” which the 
Court was reluctant to do, especially where the Court is “convinced 
that . . . this corporation has a constitutional right to speak . . . .”39 So, 
                                                                                                                 
 35. A number of Citizens United’s statutory arguments were (in our view) 
untenable. First, Citizens United argued that its movie was not an “electioneering 
communication,” because that term had been defined to require potential 
communications to over 50,000 people, and Citizen United claimed the relevant 
metric should be each individual subscriber who bought access to the movie. 
Second, Citizens United claimed that the movie was not express advocacy against 
Hillary Clinton, even though it clearly was. Third, Citizens United argued that the 
Court should develop a special exception for video on demand, since that 
technology was not included in the regulatory definition. Its fourth argument for a 
narrowing statutory interpretation is worthy of more discussion, as described 
above. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 322–29 (2010) (discussing 
Citizens United’s arguments). 
 36. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
 37. Id. at 263–65. 
 38. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319, 328. 
 39. Id. at 329. Of course if the Court had recognized a de minimis corporate (or 
union) funding exception, then Citizens United would have been allowed to 
promote its movie with non-PAC funds even within the thirty day/sixty day time 
limit as a nonprofit corporation organized to engage in political advocacy, and 
primarily funded by individuals, with de minimis corporate support. That such an 
entity, formed specifically to engage in political advocacy and concentrating the 
voices of individuals who share its political perspective, should have a 
“constitutional right to speak” throughout the election cycle is a position that is not 
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concluding that there was no narrower, non-constitutional basis for 
making its determination, the Court turned to the constitutionality of 
the restriction. 
Since political speech is at the core of First Amendment protection, 
“an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold 
officials accountable to the people,”40 the Court applied strict 
scrutiny analysis to section 441b.41 While it first recognized that a 
corporation or a union can establish a PAC to engage in precisely the 
communications at issue, and thus evade the challenged limits, the 
Court held that the regulatory requirements to establish and utilize 
such a PAC are too onerous to save section 441b from constitutional 
infirmity.42 Nor did the Court find that a compelling governmental 
interest was being advanced by the restrictions at issue.43 It 
considered three such potential interests, and rejected them in turn: 
an anti-distortion interest that had been critical to upholding the 
restriction in Austin; an anti-corruption interest that is evident 
throughout the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence; and a 
shareholder protection interest.44 
                                                                                                                 
only required by the holding of MCFL, but one that advances core First 
Amendment values. That is quite different from the Court’s actual holding that a 
for-profit corporation or union should have the right to use general treasury funds 
to promote political views with which at least some of its shareholders, employees 
and members undoubtedly disagree, bearing in mind that the statutory provision 
struck down in Citizens United only limited corporations’ or unions’ ability to 
engage in these types of communications in the immediate month(s) before a 
primary or general election—so, if anything, the statute itself was insufficiently 
protective of shareholders, employees and union members’ political views. 
 40. Id. at 339. 
 41. In U.S. constitutional analysis, if a government regulation restricts a 
fundamental right, such as that of free speech, it is subjected to “strict scrutiny.” To 
withstand strict scrutiny analysis, such a regulation must advance a compelling 
governmental interest and do so utilizing the least restrictive means possible. See 
id. at 340. 
 42. These regulatory requirements include a requirement of separately 
organizing the PAC with specified officers, limits on the PAC’s funding sources 
(employees, shareholders or union members are the only permissible funders of the 
corporation’s or union’s PAC), and quite specific reporting requirements. Id. at 
337–38. 
 43. Id. at 365 (“No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the 
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”). 
 44. Id. at 348–62. 
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In Austin, the Michigan Chamber of Commerce sought to use 
general treasury funds to express support for a specific candidate for 
elected state office even though Michigan law prohibited such 
expenditures.45 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
that restriction in 1990, identifying the compelling governmental 
interest as preventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help 
of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the 
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”46 The Court in 
Citizens United wholly rejected this anti-distortion rationale while 
giving little attention to the Austin Court’s other rationales: concerns 
about corruption or the appearance of corruption, and protecting 
individual shareholders from having corporate money used to support 
political candidates whom they opposed.47 
The Court construed the anti-distortion rationale as an effort to 
provide equal opportunity to speak, and found that goal to be foreign 
to the First Amendment.48 If accepted, the Court thought, that 
rationale “would permit Government to ban political speech simply 
because the speaker is an association that has taken on the corporate 
form;”49 it would allow “the Government [to] prohibit a corporation 
from expressing political views in media beyond those presented 
here, such as by printing books;”50 and it would eviscerate limits in 
the statute, such as those exempting media corporations from the 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 654–56 (1990). 
 46. Id. at 660, 673. 
 47. Id. at 658–59, 663. 
 48. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 314. U.S. campaign finance laws 
limit the amount of money candidates can spend as a condition of accepting 
generous federal campaign subsidies that are funded by individual tax-payers 
volunteering to contribute extra money when filing their federal tax returns. One 
provision of the BCRA that had been invalidated in 2008 increased the limits on 
campaign contributions for candidates in races where their opponent had 
contributed more than $350,000 of personal funds to their campaign, the so-called 
“Millionaire’s Provision.” See Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 743–44 (2008). The 
Court’s solicitude for wealthy candidates’ ability to use their wealth, and that of 
sympathetic PACs, without encountering countervailing spending by publicly-
funded candidates, was on clearest display in Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom 
Club PAC v. Bennett. 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011); see discussion infra in Part I.B.1. 
 49. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349. 
 50. Id. 
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section 441b limitations. In short, the Court stated, relying the anti-
distortion rationale of Austin to justify section 441b’s limitations 
would “permit[] the Government to ban the political speech of 
millions of associations of citizens . . . [and] ‘muffle the voices that 
best represent the most significant segments of the economy.’”51 
Under this view, all speakers, not just corporations, use money 
amassed in the economic marketplace to influence elections.52 In the 
Court’s view, preventing corporations from using wealth, gained in 
part through the advantages of the corporate form to distort the 
electoral process, was an insufficient governmental interest to 
support the form of censorship that section 441b imposes.53 
The anti-corruption rationale was similarly unpersuasive to the 
Court. That rationale has long been the basis for limits on direct 
contributions to candidates, including limits on individuals’ 
contributions as well as those of corporations and unions, and those 
limits have consistently been upheld.54 But it has not been extended 
to independent electioneering expenditures either in Buckley v. Valeo, 
where the rationale was held to be insufficient to support limits on 
individuals’ independent electioneering expenditures,55 or in Citizens 
United itself.56 The Court in Citizens United relied on the Buckley 
rationale, holding that the possibility of corruption is too remote from 
independent corporate or union electioneering expenditures, given 
that these expenditures by definition are not prearranged or 
coordinated with the candidates.57 The Court asserted that: 
The appearance of influence or access, furthermore, will 
not cause the electorate to lose faith in our democracy. By 
definition, an independent expenditure is political speech 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Id. at 354 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 257–58 (2003) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration to original omitted)). 
 52. Id. at 351. 
 53. See id. at 350. 
 54. Id. at 356–57 (discussing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976) 
(upholding limits on individuals’ direct campaign contributions in order to protect 
against corruption of the electoral process or quid pro quo contributions by large 
individual contributors)). 
 55. Id. at 357 (discussing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 (striking down limits on 
individuals’ independent electioneering expenditures)). 
 56. Id. at 360–61. 
 57. Id. at 357. 
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presented to the electorate that is not coordinated with a 
candidate. The fact that a corporation, or any other speaker, 
is willing to spend money to try to persuade voters 
presupposes that the people have the ultimate influence 
over elected officials.58 
The Court dispatched the third asserted governmental interest, 
protecting dissenting shareholders from being compelled to support 
political speech with which they disagreed, in two paragraphs.59 
Protecting this interest would permit banning media corporations 
from publishing editorials about different candidates for elected 
office, since even one dissenting shareholder holding stock in The 
New York Times could be harmed by its editorials.60 If shareholders 
are harmed, the Court suggested, the mechanisms of corporate 
democracy are sufficient to address that harm.61 
Having found no compelling governmental interest promoted by 
the ban on a corporation or a union using its treasury funds to make 
independent electioneering communications (as opposed to using 
separate funds specifically donated by shareholders, employees or 
union members for the specific purpose of electioneering, which the 
statute clearly allowed), the Court did not need to, and thus did not, 
analyze whether section 441b was the least restrictive alternative to 
promote that interest. It did, though, need to confront—and 
overrule—Austin, which had upheld virtually identical state 
restrictions on corporate or union electioneering,62 and portions of 
McConnell v. FEC,63 which had upheld section 441b against a facial 
challenge.64 The Court found that Austin’s anti-distortion rationale 
was not worthy of the respect that stare decisis normally requires, 
and it asserted that the government itself did not vigorously defend 
the anti-distortion rationale (relying instead on anti-corruption and 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Id. at 360 (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. at 46–47). 
 59. See id. at 361–62. 
 60. See id. at 361–62. See also id. at 351–52 (discussing the potential effects 
that the antidistortion rationale could have on political speech by media 
corporations). 
 61. Id. at 361–62. 
 62. See id. at 365. 
 63. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 64. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 332. 
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shareholder protection rationales). The Court interpreted Austin to be 
inconsistent with the previously decided First National Bank of 
Boston v. Bellotti, which struck down as unconstitutional restrictions 
on corporate spending to influence the results of a referendum, since 
“[s]peech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too 
often simply a means to control content.”65 It also noted that 
experience had shown the difficulties that Austin’s holding had 
created: “Political speech is so ingrained in our culture that speakers 
find ways to circumvent campaign finance laws.”66 The majority thus 
overruled Austin, as well as so much of McConnell as had upheld the 
section 441b limits against a facial challenge. As the Court 
concluded, “[w]e return to the principle . . . that the Government may 
not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate 
identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the 
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”67 
The Citizens United majority’s holding and rationale were rejected 
in a vigorous dissent written by Justice Stevens and joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor. The essence of the 
dissent’s argument is evident in its introductory paragraphs, portions 
of which are set out here: 
The real issue in this case concerns how, not if, the 
appellant may finance its electioneering. Citizens United is 
a wealthy nonprofit corporation that runs a political action 
committee (PAC) with millions of dollars in assets. Under 
the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), it 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 340 (discussing First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)). As 
the dissent pointed out, however, the Court held in Bellotti that corporations could 
not be prohibited from spending money to affect the outcome of a statewide 
referendum, while also recognizing that the issues involved in corporations 
spending money to affect the outcomes of electoral campaigns are entirely 
different, and that in electoral campaigns the potential for corruption could well 
justify restrictions on corporate spending. Id. at 442–43 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 788 n.26). 
 66. Id. at 364. 
 67. Id. at 365. The Court then took up the disclaimer and disclosure 
requirements of BCRA, and found these constitutional. While they may burden 
speech, they do not prevent anyone from speaking, and they promote the 
government’s interests in having an informed electorate. Id. at 371. This portion of 
the Court’s opinion was joined by all but Justice Thomas. 
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could have used those assets to televise and promote 
Hillary: The Movie wherever and whenever it wanted to. It 
also could have spent unrestricted sums to broadcast 
Hillary at any time other than the [thirty] days before the 
last primary election. Neither Citizens United’s nor any 
other corporation’s speech has been “banned”. . . .  
 The basic premise underlying the Court’s ruling is its 
iteration, and constant reiteration, of the proposition that 
the First Amendment bars regulatory distinctions based on 
a speaker’s identity, including its “identity” as a 
corporation. While that glittering generality has rhetorical 
appeal, it is not a correct statement of the law . . . .68 
. . . . 
. . . Congress has placed special limitations on campaign 
spending by corporations ever since the passage of the 
Tillman Act in 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864. We have 
unanimously concluded that this “reflects a permissible 
assessment of the dangers posed by those entities to the 
electoral process,” FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 
459 U.S. 197, 209 (1982) (NRWC), and have accepted the 
“legislative judgment that the special characteristics of the 
corporate structure require particularly careful regulation,” 
id., at 209–[]10. The Court today rejects a century of 
history when it treats the distinction between corporate and 
individual campaign spending as an invidious novelty born 
of Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 
U.S. 652 (1990). Relying largely on individual dissenting 
opinions, the majority blazes through our precedents, 
overruling or disavowing a body of case law including 
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007) 
(WRTL), McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), FEC v. 
Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146 (2003), FEC v. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. at 394–95. As the dissent later discussed, limits on the speech of 
students, inmates, members of the military, and civil service employees have been 
upheld, as have limits on corporations and unions use of their general funds in 
elections and for electioneering. See id. at 420–24 (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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NRWC, 459 U.S. 197, and California Medical Assn. v. 
FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).”69 
The dissent concluded: 
Today’s decision is backwards in many senses. It elevates 
the majority’s agenda over the litigants’ submissions, facial 
attacks over as-applied claims, broad constitutional theories 
over narrow statutory grounds, individual dissenting 
opinions over precedential holdings, assertion over 
tradition, absolutism over empiricism, rhetoric over reality. 
Our colleagues have arrived at the conclusion that Austin 
must be overruled and that §203 is facially unconstitutional 
only after mischaracterizing both the reach and rationale of 
those authorities, and after bypassing or ignoring rules of 
judicial restraint used to cabin the Court’s lawmaking 
power.70 
II.    ANALYSIS OF CITIZENS UNITED 
A. Constitutional Analysis 
In assessing the Court’s constitutional analysis in Citizens United, 
we stress at the outset that, in our view, the majority opinion is not 
indicative of a deeply-held commitment to free speech rights, 
notwithstanding the breadth of the holding and the over-wrought 
language that the majority uses.71 As Erwin Chemerinsky has 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. at 394–95 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 70. Id. at 478–79 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 71. For instance, the Court wrote, inaccurately, of Government “ban[ning] the 
political speech of millions of associations of citizens” or that “[t]he censorship we 
now confront is vast in its reach. The Government has ‘muffle[d] the voices that 
best represent the most significant segments of the economy.’” Id. at 354 (citation 
omitted). David Westbrook describes this latter language as “purple prose,” and 
“such bad lawyering as to be professionally irresponsible,” given that no speech 
had been “censored,” and given that “Hillary[: The Movie] was made and 
distributed, and the question was whether Citizens United could pay for its 
distribution using funds from its treasury,” rather than its substantial PAC to 
distribute it. See David A. Westbrook, If Not a Commercial Republic? Political 
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demonstrated, the Roberts Court has not generally displayed a robust 
commitment to Free Speech rights, and has been hostile to them in 
many instances.72 On the contrary, Chemerinsky argued that the 
Roberts Court has routinely upheld restrictions on free speech when 
the government is “functioning as an authoritarian institution” vis-à-
vis its employees,73 students,74 or prisoners.75 The Roberts Court, in 
an opinion by the Chief Justice in Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project, upheld statutory prohibitions, including criminal sanctions, 
on providing “expert advice,” “training,” “service,” and “personnel” 
to groups designated as terrorists by the U.S. Government.76 That 
holding came in a case where multiple NGOs and individuals sought 
to provide training in human rights advocacy and peacekeeping to 
Kurds living in Turkey and Tamils living in Sri Lanka, in part so they 
could bring human rights complaints to the United Nations.77 
Moreover, in two campaign finance cases where the effect of a 
statute was to increase the amount of money available to a 
financially-disfavored candidate—and thus, by the Court’s rationale 
in Citizens’ United, to increase the amount of speech—the Roberts 
Court ruled the statutes unconstitutional. In one case, Davis v. 
Federal Election Commission, the ruling was justified by rejecting as 
discriminatory the BCRA-defined subsidy to the financially 
disadvantaged candidate, and only to that candidate, in reaction to an 
opponent contributing $350,000 or more of personal funds to his or 
                                                                                                                 
Economy in the United States After Citizens United, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 35, 
44 (2011). 
 72. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 
725 (2011). 
 73. Id. (discussing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that there 
is no First Amendment protection for the speech of government employees in the 
scope of their employment-related duties, where supervising district attorney 
concluded a government witness was lying about a criminal matter, and provided 
that evidence to the defendant’s attorney as he thought constitutionally required, 
and where the district attorney was subsequently demoted and not promoted)). 
 74. Id. at 727 (discussing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (restricting 
student speech at school event when the speech, a banner with the inscription 
“Bong Hits 4 Jesus,” could reasonably be viewed as promoting illegal drug use)). 
 75. Id. at 728 (discussing Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006) (upholding 
prison regulation prohibiting inmates from having access to newspapers, 
magazines, or photographs). 
 76. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 77. See id. at 2712–14, 2723–24. 
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her own campaign.78 In a second case decided after Citizens United, 
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Fund PAC v. Bennett, the 
same majority that had decided Citizens United found 
unconstitutional an Arizona statute that increased the state subsidy to 
a financially disadvantaged candidate, subject to a fairly low cap 
(three times the regular subsidy), where her opponent contributed 
private funds to his or her own campaign or where independent 
expenditures by sympathetic PACs exceeded the cap.79 
Construing these two cases together with Citizens United, one sees 
a pattern where the Court is deeply unsympathetic to the view that 
money is speech and thus protected by the First Amendment where 
increased public funds help to equalize candidates’ resources. But 
where increased private funds could be used to the advantage of 
candidates supported by wealthy entities such as corporations, the 
Court has used rhetorical devotion to the norms of the First 
Amendment to support those electoral advantages. As Chemerinsky 
stated, what is evident in these cases is not a “commit[ment] to free 
speech,” but rather “a Court that is hostile to campaign finance 
laws—especially those restricting spending by corporations and the 
rich.”80 
Despite the Roberts Court’s inconsistent approach to the First 
Amendment, Citizens United might still be defended on the grounds 
that there are circumstances in which it is necessary to permit 
corporations to speak on behalf of their constituents. In the context of 
electoral participation, this argument is weak as a matter of corporate 
law, as we argue below.81 But it may also overstate the constitutional 
protection that should be given to “corporate speech” generally. 
The theoretical “corporate right to speak” is not well grounded in 
First Amendment theory, according to the late constitutional and 
political theorist Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin identified three core 
justifications for broadly protecting political speech rights: to meet 
the need for an informed electorate; to protect the status, integrity and 
moral development of citizens as equal partners in the political 
process; and to promote the robust criticism of government as a 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008). 
 79. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 
(2011). 
 80. Chemerinsky, supra note 72, at 734. 
 81. See infra notes 84–94 and accompanying text. 
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contribution to its honesty and integrity.82 None of these justifications 
are advanced, Dworkin argued, by “allowing rich corporations to 
swamp elections with money.”83 
In short, the Citizens United Court reached out, aggressively, to 
answer questions that had not been posed by the litigants. It did so in 
order to reject decades of prior Court precedent in a way that is 
inconsistent with First Amendment theory so as to give even more 
political power to entities that already command enormous power. 
While one can ask as a philosophical matter what speech rights 
corporations ought to have, in this electoral context the answer by the 
Court seems purely political: they ought to have the right to spend 
whatever they want to influence elections. 
It may well be that most individual companies will stay out of the 
messy, noisy, and potentially risky business of trying to shape 
individual elections directly, preferring to focus their electoral efforts 
through associations such as the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. From 
the perspective of individual legislators making decisions about 
policies to promote or resist, however, whether ads are directly 
supported by one company or indirectly supported by many through 
the Chamber of Commerce makes little difference. The point is that 
the views of the “business community” are well known, are 
communicated early and often through lobbying efforts, and must 
now be of even greater concern to legislators (and judges in states 
where judges are elected) after Citizens United than before. 
B. Corporate Law Analysis 
Turning to the more circumscribed field of corporate law, a first 
point is that one fundamental policy goal thought to be advanced by 
campaign finance law from the early 1900s has been controlling the 
agency costs of managers making campaign contributions with other 
peoples’ money.84 Derived from core principal-agent concerns,85 this 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Ronald Dworkin, The Decision that Threatens Democracy, N.Y. REV. OF 
BOOKS, May 13, 2010, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/
2010/may/13/decision-threatens-democracy. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, 
and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871 (2004) (using historical research to 
show that as early as the Tillman Act of 1907, which prohibited corporations from 
making direct campaign contributions, an animating concern was to protect 
 
64 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXV 
policy goal provides a basis for requiring the political activities of 
corporations and unions generally to be conducted through 
specifically-funded PACs with clear financial records. It also 
recognizes the First Amendment rights of “dissenting” shareholders 
not to have the corporation’s resources put in service of electoral 
goals with which they disagree. Such a view was forcefully 
articulated by Justice Brennan in his concurrence in Austin, for 
instance.86 
From a corporate law perspective one might respond that managers 
have broad discretion to make many decisions, expenditures, and 
contributions of a political nature, from contributing company 
philanthropic resources to the Metropolitan Opera rather than to the 
Urban League to deciding to support the lobbying efforts against 
climate change of the Chamber of Commerce.87 Thus, one might ask, 
                                                                                                                 
shareholders from corporate managers using “their money” to advance political 
perspectives with which the shareholders would not necessarily agree). 
 85. Winkler also recognizes that from the late 1800s there has been a concern 
with electoral corruption and/or the perception of corruption that could occur were 
corporations permitted to make direct campaign contributions or independent 
electioneering expenditures. His argument is that the agency concerns have always 
been at least as relevant to the enacting legislatures, including the Congress in 1907 
that enacted the Tillman Act. Id. at 871. 
 86. Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 677 (Brennan, 
J., concurring) (“But just as speech interests are at their zenith in [speech about 
electoral campaigns], so too are the interests of unwilling Chamber members and 
corporate shareholders forced to subsidize that speech.”). See also Victor Brudney, 
Business Corporations and Stockholders’ Rights under the First Amendment, 91 
YALE L.J. 235 (1981). Arguably this concern is given insufficient weight in 
campaign finance law, since companies electioneering expenditures are only 
limited in the thirty and sixty day period before primary and general elections. If 
so, then Citizens United just made things worse. 
 87. Indeed, one might argue that charitable contributions do raise agency and 
associational concerns similar to those raised by companies’ electoral involvement, 
precisely because of the political implications of those contributions and the 
increased heterogeneity of shareholders’ interests with respect to them. It is for this 
reason that companies’ charitable contributions have been controversial as a 
corporate governance matter, a point John Coates made in Congressional testimony 
concerning proposed legislative responses to Citizens United. Additional 
Discussion of H.R. 5175, the DISCLOSE Act, Democracy Is Strengthened by 
Casting Light on Spending in Elections Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 111th 
Cong. (2010) (statement of John C. Coates IV, Professor of Law & Economics, 
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why should electoral expenditures be understood to be any different? 
One response is that the electoral context has been recognized by the 
courts to be the most central for the exercise of core First 
Amendment values, which is why restrictions on the political speech 
rights of individuals are given the most searching analysis in this 
context.88 Conversely, corporations and unions are not members of 
the polity with voting rights, so their exercise of First Amendment 
rights in the electoral context has been understood to be properly 
limited (at least until Citizens United). As stated by the Court in First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, which upheld a corporation’s 
right to spend money to promote its views on a statewide referendum, 
“our consideration of a corporation’s right to speak on issues of 
general public interest implies no comparable right in the quite 
different context of participation in a political campaign for election 
to public office,” where the interests in preserving public confidence 
in government and protecting dissenting shareholders are 
“weighty.”89 
A further response is to argue that many other business decisions 
with political implications, such as engaging in lobbying or 
supporting trade associations that engage in lobbying, at least can be 
expected to contribute directly to the company’s welfare. While some 
shareholders, and perhaps even a substantial minority, may not agree 
with particular lobbying efforts or trade association activities, they 
can be safely assumed to share a general preference that the company 
prospers. (This statement needs to be understood with caveats, since 
many shareholders today invest through pension funds or mutual 
funds and may not know or approve of individual companies held by 
the funds.) With electoral activity, such homogeneity evaporates. In 
response to these concerns, Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson have 
                                                                                                                 
Harvard Law School) (citing Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate 
Charitable Giving, 69 U. CHI. L. REV 1191 (2002)). 
 88. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam) (stating that 
“[d]iscussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are 
integral to the operation of the system of government established by our 
Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political 
expression . . . .” ). 
 89. First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978); see also id. at 
787–88 (acknowledging that the interests in preserving public confidence in 
government and protecting dissenting shareholders are “weighty . . . in the context 
of partisan candidate elections . . . .”). 
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proposed special decision-making rules for companies’ electoral 
involvement to protect shareholders in light of Citizens United, since 
to participate in the electoral process is not an ordinary business 
decision and should be subject to heightened procedural 
requirements.90 They suggest that shareholder input be required; that 
there be a role for independent directors; and that there be real-time 
disclosure of a company’s electoral involvement.91 Yet given how 
insufficient the mechanisms of “corporate democracy” often are, it is 
unlikely that even these heightened procedural protections would 
mitigate all the associational concerns that Citizens United creates in 
the corporate law arena. 
But from one corporate law perspective Citizens United is 
unexceptional: the Court treated the corporation as separate from the 
individuals who contribute to it or can be said to comprise it 
(managers, employees, shareholders, bond holders and/or other 
capital providers). This statement should not be interpreted to say 
that as a matter of First Amendment jurisprudence the majority 
opinion is correct. It merely points out that the Court’s recognition of 
the corporation as a distinct entity, separate from its constituents, is 
standard corporate law doctrine. The Court was not always consistent 
about this, criticizing Austin for “permit[ting] the Government to ban 
the political speech of millions of associations of citizens,”92 which 
not only looks through the corporation to one set of its constituents, 
but mischaracterizes them.93 Yet the aspect of the opinion that is 
profoundly troubling from a political or First Amendment 
                                                                                                                 
 90. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: 
Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010). 
 91. See id. at 84. It is perhaps also the case that charitable contributions should 
be subjected to a similar regime, at the least involving much clearer disclosure of 
the amounts and recipients of contributions. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s 
Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 579 (1997). 
 92. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 93. There are many ways to characterize corporations, but “associations of 
citizens” is certainly distorted, and very often may be incorrect as a matter of fact, 
since an increasing percentage of shares of corporations are held by institutions, 
rather than “citizens,” including foreign institutions and foreign residents. Citizens 
United, a non-profit association formed to promote the political views of its 
members, can be characterized as an “association of citizens,” but General Motors 
cannot be so characterized. 
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perspective—that the corporate entity as a separate entity has been 
imbued with electoral free speech rights—is unproblematic as a 
matter of corporate law doctrine. In contrast, one disconcerting 
aspect of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.94 is its failure to treat the corporation as separate from 
the people who act for it. It is to that opinion that this discussion now 
turns. 
III.    KIOBEL AND CORPORTATIONS’ LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
Kiobel I95 is one of a number of opinions from the Second Circuit 
arising out of international human rights challenges to the alleged 
cooperation of the Royal Dutch Shell Group of companies with the 
Nigerian government to violently suppress political opposition to 
Shell’s activities in Nigeria. One of these cases, Wiwa v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co.,96 established important principles that expand 
possible ATS liability in the United States. In that opinion, the 
Second Circuit held that personal jurisdiction over the Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Company and the Shell Transport and Trading Company 
(together, Royal Dutch Shell), Dutch and English holding companies 
respectively, was proper in the United States, given the ongoing 
presence of Royal Dutch Shell’s investor relations office in New 
York.97 It further held that dismissal for reasons of forum non 
conveniens was improper in light of the consideration that should be 
given to the plaintiffs’ choice of forum.98 Kiobel I and Kiobel II 
clearly have the opposite import, dramatically contracting the scope 
of potential ATS liability. 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 97. Id. at 95–96. 
 98.  Id. at 99–100. This case was settled on the eve of trial for $ 15.5 million, a 
large portion being contributed to a Nigerian NGO to use for economic 
development purposes. For an overview of the cases against Royal Dutch Shell, see 
Wiwa et al v. Royal Dutch Petroleum et al, CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, 
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/wiwa-v.-royal-dutch-petroleum#files 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2013). The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) has acted 
as co-counsel in all of these cases. 
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A. Facts and Legal Background of Kiobel 
The facts underlying all of the Royal Dutch/Shell litigation arise 
out of the Nigerian government’s suppression of the Ogoni people’s 
political activism in response to Royal Dutch Shell’s (and other oil 
companies’) drilling in the Ogoni region of the Niger River delta in 
Nigeria. According to the plaintiffs (and confirmed by a number of 
international human rights and environmental organizations), the oil 
development and extraction activities in the Ogoni region since 1958 
have involved decades of extensive gas flaring, enormous 
environmental damage to lands and waters, and forcible resettling of 
villages. These activities, which plaintiffs in both cases allege to have 
depended on coercive appropriation of Ogoni land, were said to have 
provided little or no economic benefits to the Ogoni people but rather 
to have destroyed their land, water and air.99 
The Ogoni people’s resistance to these activities developed slowly, 
but eventually became highly visible through actions of the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) led by 
Ken Saro-Wiwa, an internationally-recognized writer. The 
complaints in both Wiwa and Kiobel allege that Royal Dutch Shell 
Group’s wholly-owned Nigerian subsidiary, the Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd. (“Shell Nigeria”), eventually 
encouraged the Nigerian government in its violent suppression of 
Ogoni political activism. The complaint in Wiwa contended that Shell 
Nigeria recruited the Nigerian government to arrest Ken Saro-Wiwa 
and other leaders of MOSOP on false charges, falsely imprison them, 
torture them, and try them and put them to death, all on false 
evidence; and that various other members of the Ogoni community 
were beaten and shot.100 Similarly, the complaint in Kiobel alleged 
that Shell Nigeria aided the Nigerian military in its egregious human 
rights abuses, including the beating and raping of villagers, false 
arrests, torture and extrajudicial killings.101 The specific allegations 
against Shell Nigeria in Kiobel were that it supported the military’s 
efforts by giving soldiers food, helping with transportation, allowing 
                                                                                                                 
 99. The facts discussed here are taken from the discussion of the facts in Wiwa, 
226 F.3d at 92–94. 
 100. Id. at 92. 
 101. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (U.S. 2013). 
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Shell’s property to be used as a staging ground for the military’s 
activities, and paying the soldiers.102 
The ATS provided the subject matter jurisdictional basis for 
plaintiffs to bring both Wiwa and Kiobel in the United States. This 
statute, enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, grants original 
jurisdiction in the United States District Courts over “any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
nations or a treaty of the United States.”103 The statute was virtually 
ignored for almost 200 years. Then, in 1980, the Second Circuit 
upheld the assertion of ATS jurisdiction in a case challenging a 
Paraguayan police officer’s actions in torturing to death the brother 
of the plaintiff.104 Fifteen years later, the Second Circuit decided for 
the first time that private actors, as well as state actors, can be 
reached in ATS cases.105 Since then, the ATS has been the statutory 
basis for a wide range of cases being brought in U.S. courts alleging 
that the actions of U.S. and foreign multinationals have violated 
international human rights law.106 The Supreme Court gave cautious 
encouragement to this use of the statute in 2004 when it decided in 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that the ATS is a basis for subject matter 
jurisdiction in the United States, and that the substantive contours of 
the cause of action are defined by jus cogens norms of international 
human rights law, as incorporated into U.S. federal common law.107 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Id. 
 103. Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2008). “Alien Torts Claim Act” 
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of the numerous procedural and substantive difficulties ATS litigation presents. For 
a comprehensive overview of the legal developments underlying use of the ATS as 
a mechanism of corporate accountability, written by one of the attorneys who is co-
counsel on many of these cases, see Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: “The 
Door is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 
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While the ATS is important in allowing these cases to be heard in 
U.S. courts, there have been very few successful outcomes against 
corporations where cases have proceeded to a final judgment or 
settlement.108 Notwithstanding these meager positive results to date, 
the use of the ATS as a mechanism for bringing corporate 
accountability claims is only fifteen years old. Given how long 
litigation takes in the United States, that is a relatively short period of 
time for the development of a new area of law. Moreover—and this 
may be of little comfort to unsuccessful plaintiffs—at the least ATS 
claims allow the facts of the alleged corporate activities to be brought 
into the open through court-monitored discovery, creating an 
important mechanism for promoting transparency and corporate 
accountability. The decision of the Second Circuit in Kiobel I is a 
significant defeat for claimants, however, and its affirmance on other 
grounds by the U.S. Supreme Court may well portend the end of ATS 
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v. Republic of Cuba, 996 F. Supp. 1239, 1253–54 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (Plaintiffs, the 
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Ferdinand E. Marcos, were awarded $1.2 billion in exemplary damages). 
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corporate accountability litigation, since (a) it would be the highly 
unusual case in which individual corporate employees acting in 
foreign countries would be susceptible to the personal jurisdiction of 
U.S. courts, and (b) even if they were, they could not be sued if their 
actions took place outside of the United States. 
B. The Kiobel I Decision 
In an opinion by Judge Cabranes that was joined by Chief Judge 
Jacobs, the Second Circuit held that a corporation as a juridical entity 
cannot be sued under the ATS.109 The court stated: 
From the beginning, however, the principle of individual 
liability for violations of international law has been limited 
to natural persons—not “juridical” persons such as 
corporations—because the moral responsibility for a crime 
so heinous and unbounded as to rise to the level of an 
“international crime” has rested solely with the individual 
men and women who have perpetuated it.110 
The court recognized that “nothing in this opinion limits or 
forecloses suits under the ATS against the individual perpetrators of 
violations of customary international law—including the employees, 
managers, officers, and directors of a corporation . . . .”111 But it held 
that “insofar as plaintiffs bring claims under the ATS against 
corporations, plaintiffs fail to allege violations of the law of nations, 
and plaintiffs’ claims fall outside the limited jurisdiction provided by 
the ATS.”112 
A key aspect of the court’s rationale was that “international law, 
and not domestic law, governs the scope of liability for violations of 
customary international law under the ATS.”113 In seeking to define 
the customary international law applicable to the question of 
corporate liability, the court canvassed widely accepted sources of 
international legal norms, including treaties, prior tribunals 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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 111. Id. at 122. 
 112. Id. at 120. 
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(especially the Nuremberg trials of I.G. Farben officials for their role 
in collaborating with the Nazis); other tribunals; and the writings of 
recognized international law scholars. It concluded that “customary 
international law has steadfastly rejected the notion of corporate 
liability for international crimes, and no international tribunal has 
ever held a corporation liable for a violation of the law of nations.”114 
In concurring in the judgment of dismissal of the plaintiff’s 
claims,115 but not in the court’s rationale, Judge Leval wrote that the 
majority’s analysis went astray in looking to international law to 
define both the substantive wrong and the proper procedures for 
enforcement.116 Customary international law defines the actions that 
are violations of jus cogens norms—that is, norms that are specific, 
universal, and obligatory.117 In that sense, the majority in Kiobel I 
was correct that “international law . . . governs the scope of 
liability. . . .”118 Yet, according to Judge Leval, international law then 
leaves to domestic law questions of enforcement, including whether 
an alleged violation can be addressed by criminal enforcement or by 
private civil litigation.119 Unlike the United States, most countries in 
the world do not impose criminal liability on juridical entities such as 
corporations either for crimes defined by domestic statutes or 
international law. This denial of corporate criminal liability is 
premised on the belief that an artificial entity cannot have a criminal 
intent, and that criminal punishment of a juridical entity cannot serve 
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 115. In a prior opinion, the Second Circuit had held that in order to establish 
liability for aiding and abetting violations of international human rights law, 
plaintiffs must establish that the defendants acted with a purpose to bring about the 
violation, and that merely knowing that a violation was likely to result was 
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See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., Inc., 654 F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that a 
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 116. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 152 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 117. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004). 
 118. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 126. 
 119. Id. at 152 (Leval, J., concurring). 
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the “punitive objectives of punishment.”120 That, according to Judge 
Leval, is why, for example, the Nuremberg Tribunal did not assert 
criminal jurisdiction over I.G. Farben as a company.121 And yet, “[i]n 
contrast, the imposition of civil liability on corporations serves 
perfectly the objective of civil liability to compensate victims for the 
wrongs inflicted on them and is practiced everywhere in the 
world.”122 While the United States is unique in granting its national 
courts jurisdiction for civil enforcement of violations of customary 
international law, Congress has clearly done so in the ATS, according 
to Judge Leval,123 and that Congressional mandate must be respected. 
The holding in Kiobel I disclaiming the existence of corporate civil 
liability for violations of customary international law has been 
explicitly rejected in two recent Circuit Court opinions, one by Judge 
Rogers of the D.C. Circuit in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp.124 and the 
other by Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit in Flomo v. Firestone 
Natural Rubber Co.125 Both opinions agree with Judge Leval’s 
analysis, specifically that international law defines the scope of the 
substantive wrong, and domestic law the mode of enforcement.126 
Judge Rogers explained: 
Although customary international law provides rules for 
determining whether international disapprobation attaches 
to certain types of conduct, such as torture, extrajudicial 
killing, prolonged arbitrary detention, or aiding and 
abetting the same, one could not expect . . . states out of “a 
sense of legal obligation,” to produce detailed rules of 
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procedure and evidence on matters like res judicata, 
burdens of proof, and respondeat superior.127 
Moreover, both opinions asserted that an important factual premise 
of the Kiobel I court was wrong. The Kiobel I majority was 
convinced its analysis was correct by what it interpreted as a lack of 
precedent for punishing a corporation, rather than its employees, for 
violations of customary international law, even in such egregious 
examples as chemical company I.G. Farben’s collaboration with the 
Nazis. In fact, Judge Posner pointed out in Flomo, corporations such 
as I.G. Farben were punished: they were dissolved and on the 
authority of customary international law.128 But he would not have 
been troubled even if there had been no such punishment: “And 
suppose no corporation had ever been punished for violating 
customary international law. There is always a first time for litigation 
to enforce a norm; there has to be.”129 The Exxon Mobil court, in 
scholarly detail, also recounted the punishments that had been levied 
against corporations found to have collaborated with the Nazis, 
including dissolution, and that these punishments were specifically 
tied to violations of international law.130 
This question of the liability of a corporation, as a juridical entity, 
for violations of customary international law has an 
“intersectionality” that led the Kiobel I majority astray, in our 
opinion. Does the resolution of the case really involve only 
international law, as the Kiobel I majority stated,131 or does it involve 
the intersection of international law with domestic tort law and 
agency law? The Exxon Mobil majority recognized these other bodies 
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 129. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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of law as relevant. In examining the history of the ATS, the court 
found that “[b]y 1789, corporate liability in tort was an accepted 
principle of tort law in the United States.”132 Indeed, the Exxon Mobil 
majority concluded: 
The law of the United States has been uniform since its 
founding that corporations can be held liable for the torts 
committed by their agents. This is confirmed in 
international practice, both in treaties and in legal systems 
throughout the world. Given that the law of every 
jurisdiction in the United States and of every civilized 
nation, and the law of numerous international treaties, 
provide that corporations are responsible for their torts, it 
would create a bizarre anomaly to immunize corporations 
from liability for the conduct of their agents in lawsuits 
brought for “shockingly egregious violations of universally 
recognized principles of international law.”133 
In fact, the question that the Kiobel I majority did not address is 
precisely the one that the Exxon Mobil opinion highlights: if the 
individual officers or directors can be held liable for international 
human rights violations, as Kiobel I recognized, on what theory 
would the corporation itself not be vicariously liable? After all, the 
issue before the court was not the direct liability of the company, that 
is, the liability of the company based on official actions of the board 
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of directors, acting as a board. Rather, the question was the vicarious 
liability of the Nigerian subsidiary for the torts of its employees, 
based on the very well established common law theory of respondeat 
superior. Respondeat superior is a strict form of vicarious liability of 
the company for the torts and other wrongs committed by its 
employees in the scope of their business—strict because even if the 
employees are acting contrary to company policy or direct 
instructions, the company will be vicariously liable for their 
actions.134 
A further, separate question is the liability of the parent companies, 
the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (a Netherlands corporation) 
and Shell Transport and Trading Co., PLC (an English corporation 
until 2005, when it was reincorporated in the Netherlands), for the 
actions of the Nigerian subsidiary, which, as the case was framed, 
would require piercing the corporate veil under the law of the state of 
incorporation.135 So to ask if the two Royal Dutch Shell companies 
can be directly liable under international law, as the Second Circuit 
has framed the issue, is to ask the wrong question. The questions 
should be: can the Nigerian subsidiary corporation be vicariously 
liable for this type of wrong under Nigerian law136 if its employees 
are found to have committed international human rights violations? If 
it is vicariously liable, is there any reason to pierce the corporate veil 
to reach the parent companies? As this line of inquiry shows, 
ultimately finding ATS liability over the parent companies will be 
difficult, but not because corporations as juridical entities are not 
amenable to suit under the ATS. 
C. Kiobel II 
On April 17, 2013, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the 
judgment of the Second Circuit. In four separate opinions, the nine 
justices relied solely on the extraterritoriality issue that the Court had 
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addressed in reargument,137 and none of the opinions directly 
addressed the corporate liability rationale that had been the basis of 
the Second Circuit’s 2-1 ruling. Writing for the Court (and joined by 
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito), Chief Justice Roberts 
framed the question as “not whether petitioners have stated a proper 
claim under the ATS, but whether a claim may reach conduct 
occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign.”138 The Court turned 
to “a canon of statutory interpretation known as the presumption 
against extraterritorial application,” which “provides that ‘[w]hen a 
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it 
has none.’”139 Examining the “text, history, and purposes of the 
ATS,”140 the Court found no basis to derogate from this presumption. 
It concluded that “all the relevant conduct took place outside the 
United States,” and that the claims did not “touch and concern the 
territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.”141 
Justices Kennedy and Alito each wrote a brief concurrence. The 
former emphasized the fact-specific nature of the Court’s holding, 
noting that in future cases “the proper implementation of the 
presumption against extraterritorial application may require some 
further elaboration and explanation.”142 The latter wrote separately 
“to set out the broader standard that [led him] to the conclusion that 
this case falls within the scope of the presumption,” emphasizing that 
the domestic conduct alleged in this case did not fall within “the 
‘focus’ of congressional concern” in 1789—”violation of safe 
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy”—
but that it might in future cases.143 
Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and 
Kagan) filed a lengthy concurrence. Although unwilling to rely on 
the presumption against extraterritoriality, he agreed with the Court’s 
conclusion that, in Kiobel, “the parties and relevant conduct lack 
sufficient ties to the United States for the ATS to provide 
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jurisdiction.”144 Specifically, he pointed out, this is what some have 
called a “foreign-cubed” case: “The plaintiffs are not United States 
nationals . . . The conduct at issue took place abroad. And the 
plaintiffs allege, not that the defendants directly engaged in acts of 
torture, genocide, or the equivalent, but that they helped others (who 
are not American nationals) to do so.”145 In the future, however, 
cases presenting a more direct connection with the United States, 
including conduct by a defendant that “substantially and adversely 
affects an important American national interest,” might warrant a 
different conclusion.146 
Although none of the opinions addressed the corporate liability 
issue directly, both the Court and Justice Breyer commented in 
passing on the status of corporate defendants, in ways that do not 
conflict with the Second Circuit’s decision. The Chief Justice’s 
opinion for the Court, immediately after posing the question of 
whether the claims asserted “touch and concern the territory of the 
United States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritoriality,” observed that “[c]orporations are often 
present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere 
corporate presence suffices.”147 In a generally parallel vein, Justice 
Breyer noted at the end of his opinion that the defendants “are two 
foreign corporations” whose “only presence in the United States 
consists of an office in New York City (actually owned by a separate 
but affiliated company).”148 He concluded that, “under these 
circumstances, even if the New York office were a sufficient basis for 
asserting general [personal] jurisdiction . . . it would ‘reach too far 
to say’ that such ‘mere corporate presence suffices.’”149 Thus, the 
Court and the concurring justices apparently agreed that corporate 
presence, a traditional linchpin of personal jurisdiction, cannot by 
itself create subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS. 
At the end of the Kiobel saga, we know two things: (1) that a 
majority of today’s Supreme Court does not believe that the ATS can 
be applied to extraterritorial conduct, though at least four justices are 
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open to reassessing that conclusion on different facts; and (2) that it 
is still the law of the Second Circuit that corporations cannot be sued 
under the ATS, even for the torts of their employees and agents. As 
we will argue in the remainder of the article, these results contribute 
to a strong negative message about the accountability of global 
corporations for socially irresponsible behavior outside their home 
countries. 
   IV.    IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
In Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, the Supreme 
Court said, for the first time, that “[a] corporation is an artificial 
person, existing in contemplation of law, and endowed with certain 
power and franchises” by state law.150 It was this aspect of a 
corporation’s existence, its artificial personhood, having only the 
powers that states decide are necessary for it to fulfill its economic 
purpose, that Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized in his dissent from 
the recognition of corporate free speech rights in First National Bank 
of Boston v. Bellotti.151 Chief Justice Rehnquist thought that the 
proper constitutional inquiry was to “seek to determine which 
constitutional protections are ‘incidental to [the corporation’s] very 
existence.’”152 That inquiry led him to view as essential the 
constitutional right to Due Process for the protection of property, 
and—for media corporations—the First Amendment right to express 
political opinions. But other liberty interests, such as First 
Amendment rights for corporate political speech generally, he 
thought not only unnecessary for corporations to advance their 
economic interests, but dangerous. In prescient terms he stated that: 
A State grants to a business corporation the blessings of 
potentially perpetual life and limited liability to enhance its 
efficiency as an economic entity. It might reasonably be 
concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the 
economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political 
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sphere. Furthermore, it might be argued that liberties of 
political expression are not at all necessary to effectuate the 
purposes for which States permit commercial corporations 
to exist. So long as the Judicial Branches of the State and 
Federal Governments remain open to protect the 
corporation’s interest in its property, it has no need, though 
it may have the desire, to petition the political branches for 
similar protection.153 
We have come far from 1819 and the Dartmouth College Court’s 
view of the corporation as an “artificial person.” As the Kiobel I 
majority recognized, the idea of the corporation “as ‘persons’ with 
duties, liability and rights . . . continues to evolve in complex and 
unexpected ways.”154 With this view untouched by the Supreme 
Court, we have arrived at the point—at least in the Second Circuit—
of looking through the corporation to its constituent employees, 
including directors and officers, treating the corporation itself as 
“invisible [and] intangible”155—but only for the purposes of 
adjudicating its international human rights obligations. If that 
happens, what the Court will have constructed is a tragically ironic 
jurisprudence that ignores the corporate entity in the context of 
international accountability but recognizes it for every other purpose, 
from limiting liability to tax avoidance156 to exercising broad 
political rights. 
The general point we would emphasize is that the existing 
mechanisms for corporations to exercise political power in the United 
States are varied and extremely robust, while the mechanisms for 
imposing accountability—certainly accountability for international 
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human rights violations—are attenuated and insufficient. Even before 
Citizens United, corporations had broad authority to run political 
advertisements (just not in the months before a primary or general 
election), to establish political action committees (PACs), to engage 
in political advertising, and to use the funds and other organizational 
resources of the firm to communicate with shareholders and 
employees and encourage them to support the PAC. Corporations, 
because of their broad free speech rights, have unlimited power to 
engage in “issue advertising.” Even blatantly self-interested, 
misleading advertisements by corporations and corporate-funded 
think tanks on such topics as climate change or “clean coal” cannot 
be excluded from the marketplace of ideas because of how the First 
Amendment has been construed.157 Corporations have broad 
constitutional authority to engage in lobbying, and do so 
prodigiously.158 One would expect the lobbying efforts of 
corporations to be self-interested, and corporate law might demand it 
to be. But as we have seen in the United States in recent years, the 
self-interested lobbying of financial, oil, gas, coal, insurance, and 
pharmaceutical corporations has permeated the political environment 
and has created difficulties for advancing legislation in the public 
interest even where a majority of Americans support that 
legislation.159 In this context, giving corporations additional, 
unrestrained powers to shape electoral outcomes is not only 
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unnecessary, but deeply problematic, leading America away from 
any vision of democracy that the Founders would recognize, in our 
view. 
The particular problem for the promotion of CSR is the shrinking 
of the shadow of the law. As we have documented elsewhere, CSR 
participants and stakeholders cite many possible motivations for CRS 
activity.160 They range from a good-faith belief in improving the 
world to a more cynical concern about image management.161 But 
many people in the field put primary emphasis on another motive: 
preempting “hard” regulation. 162 That is, companies engage in often-
elaborate “soft” self-regulatory activities in order to head off 
demands for national and international law makers to impose 
traditional legal controls. In this important sense, companies pursue 
CSR in the shadow of the law, both current and prospective. 
One example of this that we have studied in detail is the Equator 
Principles, a self-imposed (and largely unenforceable) regime of 
social and environmental review that has been agreed to by the large 
multinational banks that finance huge infrastructure projects in the 
developing world.163 In the view of many of those who have 
participated in this endeavor, a primary has been to a build a case that 
“hard” regulation by national and international authorities is 
unnecessary.164 Almost all of the relevant stakeholders believe that 
the Equator Principles are doing some good, at least by making the 
banks stop and study the potential social and environmental 
consequences of the projects they fund.165 If so, then any motivation 
is welcome. 
Good-faith belief in CSR and the need to manage a company’s 
image are constants, motives that will exist (or not) regardless of 
external influences like legal policy. But corporate executives and 
boards will pursue soft-law CSR solutions to preempt hard law only 
if the threat of hard law is real. If, on the contrary, the Supreme Court 
takes away a historically significant means of enforcing 
responsibility for human rights violations, then a potentially 
                                                                                                                 
 160. Conley & Williams, Engage, supra note 1, at 20–21. 
 161. Id. 13–18. 
 162. Id. at 20; Conley & Williams, Global Banks, supra note 1, at 564–65. 
 163. Conley & Williams, Global Banks, supra note 1, at 542–49. 
 164. Id. at 564–65. 
 165. Id. at 567–71. 
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important motivation for voluntary CSR activities will have been 
undermined. Since the Court has, at the same time, expanded 
corporations’ ability to influence the political process, that effect will 
have been multiplied. The shadow of the law will diminish in extent 
even as the power of corporations to influence the law’s content will 
grow. 
CONCLUSION 
Corporate social responsibility can be interpreted as yet another 
example of market self-regulation, asking corporations to volunteer 
to recognize and address their negative externalities in ways beyond 
what is required by law. With respect to core financial issues, the 
track record of devolving the task of advancing public welfare to 
corporate self-regulation does not inspire confidence. Consider the 
example of derivatives, which eventually undermined global 
financial stability in spectacular fashion. Why should we expect 
better in the case of corporate social responsibility? On the contrary, 
the same fragility and insufficiency seem likely. This skepticism only 
grows in the context of Citizens United and Kiobel, which, 
respectively, expanded the ability of corporations to exert political 
influence and narrowed the mechanisms of potential corporate 
accountability. In a globalizing world, recognizing the corporation as 
a “juridical person” for every purpose other than for legal 
accountability for international human rights violations cannot be 
brought into balance with the voluntary constraints of corporate 
social responsibility. 
